Vertical competition between manufacturers and retailers and upstream incentives to innovate and differentiate by Venturini, Luciano
Vertical competition  between  manufacturers  and retailers  and 
upstream  incentives  to innovate  and differentiate
Luciano  Venturini
Universita'  Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Largo A. Gemelli, 1 20123  Milano, Italy. 
Department  of International  Economics, Via Necchi 5 20123, Milano, tel. +39-
02.7234.2692; fax. +39- 02.7234.2475.  Institute  of Food Economics, Via Emilia 
Parmense,  84 29100  Piacenza,  tel. +39- 0523.599.225.
 E-mail: luciano.venturini@unicatt.it  
Paper prepared  for presentation  at the  98 th EAAE Seminar ‘Marketing  Dynamics  
within  the Global Trading  System: New  Perspectives’, Chania, Crete, Greece  as in: 
29 June – 2 July, 2006
Copyright   2006   by   [Luciano   Venturini].    All   rights   reserved.     Readers   may   make  
verbatim  copies of this document  for non- commercial purposes by any means, provided  
that this copyright  notice appears on all such copies.
1 Vertical competition  between  manufacturers  and retailers  and upstream  
incentives  to innovate  and differentiate
Luciano  Venturini
Universita'  Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Largo A. Gemelli, 1 20123  Milano, Italy. 
Department  of International  Economics, Via Necchi 5 20123, Milano, tel. +39-
02.7234.2692; fax. +39- 02.7234.2475.  Institute  of Food Economics, Via Emilia 
Parmense,  84 29100  Piacenza,  tel. +39- 0523.599.225.
 E-mail: luciano.venturini@unicatt.it  
Abstract 
Vertical   competition,   namely   competition   between   retailers’   store   brands   (or   private   labels)   and  
manufacturers’ brands  has  become  a crucial factor  of change  of the competitive  environment  in several  
industries,   particularly   in   the   grocery   and   food   industries.   Despite   the   growing   literature   on   the  
determinants  of the  phenomenon,  one  topic  area  regarding  the  impact  of vertical  competition  on  the 
upstream  incentives  to adopt  non- price strategies  such  as product  innovation  as well as horizontal  and  
vertical product  differentiation  has  so far received  little attention.  An idea often  put  forward  is that  the  
increasing  bargaining  power  of retailers  and  higher  vertical  competitive  pressures  can  have  negative  
effects  on such  incentives  by lowering  manufacturers’ profits.  On the  other  hand,  there  is a significant  
empirical   evidence   supporting   the   view   that   non- price   strategies   of   product   innovation   and  
differentiation  continue  to  play  a key role  and  remain  a crucial  source  of competitive  advantages  for  
several manufacturers.  
In this  paper,  we present  a simple  conceptual  framework  which  allows  us  to focus  on  two  hypotheses  
which  interacting  explain  why the  disincentive  effects  are  not  so obvious.  The first  hypothesis  regards  
the  existence  of an inverse  relationship  between  the  strength  of a given  brand  and  the  retail margin  as  
suggested  by Robert  Steiner. Through  a two- stage  model  in which  manufacturers  do not  sell directly to 
final consumers  and  the  retail industry  is not  perfectly  competitive, Steiner  argued  persuasively that  in 
such  models  leading  brands  in a product  category  yield  lower  retail  margins  than  less  strong  brands.  
Retailers  are  forced  to  stock  strong  brands  and  therefore  have  relatively  less  bargaining  power  in 
negotiating  wholesale  prices.  In addition,  price  competition  among  retailers  is more  intense  on  strong  
brands  since  consumers  select  these  brands  to form  their  perceptions  of stores’ price  competitiveness  
and  are ready  to shift  to lower price stores  if retail price of these  brands  is not  perceived  as competitive. 
Thus,   intensive   intrabrand   competitive   pressures   discipline   retailers   pricing   policy   on   stronger  
manufacturer  brands  much  more  than  on weaker  brands.  A key prediction  of Steiner’s two- stage  model  
is that,  since  manufacturers’ non- price  strategies  have a margin  depressing  impact  which  is additional  
to  their  direct  demand- creating  effect,  manufacturers  face  greater  incentives  to  invest  in advertising  
and  R&D. 
The second  central  hypothesis  in our  framework  is that  in a world  of asymmetric  brands  and  intense  
vertical  competition  there  is a further  mechanism  at  work  due  to  retailers’ delisting  decisions.  Given 
that  retailers  have to make  room  for their  store  brands  at the  point  of sale, they  have to readjust  their  
assortments  delisting  some  manufacturer  brands.  Retailers  would  like  delisting  strong  brands  given  
that  the  retailer’s  margin  on  these  brands  is lower.  The  problem  is that  strong  brands  can  contrast  
vertical  pressures  better  than  weaker  brands  and  cannot  be delisted.  In making  shelf- space  decisions,  
rational  retailers  will recognise  that  they  can  delist  only the  brands  whose  brand  loyalty  is lower  than  
their store  loyalty. On the contrary, retailers  cannot  delist  brands  for which  brand  loyalty is greater  than  
store  loyalty. This implies  that  manufacturer  brands  operate  in a two- region  environment.  We call these  
two  regions,  respectively, the  ‘delisting’ and  ‘no- delisting’ region  and  show  that  the  demarcation  point  
between  them  is given by the level of retailer’s store  loyalty. 
By combining  the  Steiner’s hypothesis  with  the  mechanism  of delisting,  we argue  that  in a competitive  
environment  characterized  by vertical competition  is at work a threshold  effect  which  increases  optimal  
2R&D and  advertising  expenditures.  The  intuition  is that  it is vital for  manufacturers  willing  to  remain  
sellers  of branded  products  to keep  brand  loyalty  of their  brands  at a level higher  than  retailer’s store  
loyalty. And the  only way to pursue  this  goal and  avoid  to be involved  into  the  risk  of being  delisted  is 
to boost  brands.  We also show  that  vertical competitive pressures  are particularly strong  on second- tier  
brands.  A brief  review  of some  recent  patterns  and  stylised  facts  in the  food  industries  and  grocery  
channels  consistent  with these  predictions  conclude  the paper.
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1. Introduction
Large- scale retailing changes  profoundly  the relationships  between  manufacturers  and  
retailers. In particular,  the  existence  of private  labels  (or store  brands)  adds  a new and  
important  dimension  to competition.  Whenever  in a category  product,  retailers  launch  
their  private  labels,  the  competitive  environment  is characterized  by the  existence  of 
vertical  competition,  namely  the  competition  between  retailers’  private  brands  and  
manufacturers’  brands.  This  competition  has  become  increasingly  relevant  in several  
industries,  particularly  in  the  grocery  and  food  industries.  As  a  consequence,  the 
phenomenon   of   private   labels   has   received   significant   attention   in   the   recent  
literatures  of marketing, economics  and  strategic management. 1
The   literature   on   private   labels   has   addressed   several   issues.   Most   studies   have 
examined  why retailers  introduce  private  labels  and  their  impact  on  the  intensity  of 
retail price competition  (Cotterill and  Putsis, 2000; Gabrielsen  and  Sørgard,  2000; Hoch 
and  Banjeri, 1993; Mills, 1995, 1999; Narashiman  and  Wilcox, 1998; Bontems,  Monier-
Dilhan  and  Réquillart,  1999;  Putsis,  1997;  Putsis  and  Cotterill,  1999),  their  strategic 
positioning  and  market  success  (Sayman  et  al. 2002;  Scott- Morton  and  Zettelmeyer  
2001;  Raju  et  al. 1995;  Dhar  and  Hoch  1997),  the  consequences  of  store  brands  on 
retailer  profitability (Ailawadi and  Harlam  2002, Kadiyali et al. 2000). 
There  is also a growing  literature  addressing  bargaining  power  between  manufacturers  
and  retailers  in  general  and  how,  in  particular,  store  brands  contribute  to  increase  
buyer  power  and  enable the retailer  to get input  price concessions  (Katz, 1989; Vickers  
and   Waterson,   1991;   Berto   Villas- Boas,   2002;   Mills,   1995;   Bomtems,   Monier   and  
Réquillart,1999; Chintagunta  et al., 2002).
Despite  the  growing  literature,  the  presence  and  development  of store  brands  raise, 
however,  some  issues  which  remain  relatively underexplored.  One topic  area  which  is 
still  particularly  underresearched  regards  the  effect  of  the  competitive  interaction  
between  private  labels  and  national  brands  on the  upstream  incentives  to adopt  non-
price  strategies  such  as product  innovation  as well as horizontal  and  vertical  product  
differentiation.  
As a result,  the  issue  remains  characterized  by different  and  conflicting  views both  at 
theoretical  and  empirical  level. Some  views  emphasize  the  positive  impact  of private  
labels  and  buyer  power  for innovation  and  product  quality. By contrast,  other  authors  
propend  for  less  optimistic  views. As suggested  by Mills (1999), brand  manufacturers  
can  develop  different  counterstrategies  in  response  to  the  development  of  private  
labels.  Some  of  these  strategies  refer  to  short- term  decisions  (for  example,  price  
1  For   a   recent   survey   of   the   literature   regarding   the   impact   of   private   labels  
introduction  and  expansion,  see Bergès- Sennou, Bontems  and  Réquillart  (2004).
3promotions),  while others  are more  long- term.  National  brand  producers  can  react  to 
private   labels   by   using   a   product   differentiation   strategy,   or   by   developing   new 
products.  Similarly, Bazoche, Giraud- Héraud  and  Soler (2005) suggest  that  the creation  
of higher  quality private  label is not  necessarily detrimental  but  can increase  upstream  
incentives  to innovate  and  improve  quality.
The  possibility  that  vertical  competition  can  affect  positively  uptream  incentives  to 
adopt  non- price strategies  has  been  noted  by Steiner  (2004) who confirming  a similar  
conjecture   in   Steiner   (1987)   writes:   “[..in]   a   mixed   regimen   in   which   the   leading  
national  brands  are  effectively challenged  by the  private  labels  of the  major  retailers  
[…] creates  an  environment  that  retains  most- all of  the  benefits  of  manufacturers’  
brand  domination  – frequent  product  innovation,  scale  economies  at  both  stage  and  
slim leading national  brand  retail margins” (p. 122).
But an idea  often  put  forward  is that  the  increasing  bargaining  power  of retailers  and  
higher  vertical  competitive  pressures  can  have  negative  effects  on  such  incentives  by 
lowering  manufacturers’  profits  and,  as a consequence,  making  it even  more  difficult  
to finance  advertising  and  R&D. Hence, the negative impact  on the non- price strategies  
that  these  expenditures  contribute  to finance,  namely  product  innovation,  horizontal  
and  vertical  product  differentiation.    There  is,  indeed,  growing  concern  about  the 
consequences   of   buyer   power.   For   instance,   a   report   prepared   for   the   European  
Commission   suggests   that   when   facing   powerful   buyers   suppliers   may   “reduce  
investment   in   new   products   or   product   improvements,   advertising   and   brand  
building”  (European  Commission,  1999). A recent   Federal  Trade  Commission  report  
suggests  that  consumers  'could  be adversely affected  by the exercise of buyer  power  in 
the  long run,  if prices  to suppliers  are reduced  below  the  competitive  level and  if the 
suppliers  respond  by under- investing  in innovation  or production  (FTC, 2001).
The aim of this  paper  is to improve  our  understanding  of the consequences  of vertical 
competition.  Contrary  to  the  view of a negative  impact  of  buyer  power  and  vertical 
competition  on upstream  incentives, we show  that  there  are substantial  and  persistent  
incentives  to adopt  non- price  strategies  of innovation  and  differentiation.  We do  not  
develop  a formal  model.  More simply,  we provide  a simple  conceptual  framework  to 
illustrate  how  in a competitive  environment  characterized  by the  presence  of vertical 
competition,  manufacturers  may  face  stronger  incentives  to  adopt  innovation  and  
differentiation  strategies  than  in  an  environment  in  which  the  only  dimension  of 
competition  is horizontal. 
We build  on  the  two- stage  approch  developed  by Steiner.  A key finding  of Steiner’s 
analysis  is that  in a dual- stage  model  there  is an  inverse  relationship  between  the 
strength  of a brand  and  the retailer’s margin, namely the difference  between  a brand’s  
retail  price  and   its  wholesale   (or  factory)  price.  Leading  brands   yield  lower   retail 
margins  than  less  strong  brands.  The  implication  is that  manufacturers  face  greater  
incentives  to invest  in advertising  and  R&D to establish  and  increase  brand’s  strength  
because,  in  addition  to  their  direct  demand- creating  effect,  the  margin- depressing  
effect   of   these   strategies   leads   to   incresing   returns   to   advertising   and   R&D 
expenditures.  
Building on this  literature,  we develop  a theoretical framework  that  combines  the two-
stage approach  developed  by Steiner  with the notion  that  in order  to create  shelf space  
for their  brands,  retailers  have to delist  some  national  brands.  This allows  us to show  
the  existence  of a further  mechanism  in addition  to the  one  focused  by Steiner, which  
4contributes  to  increase  the  incentives  of upstream  firms  to  reinforce  innovation  and  
differentiation  strategies.  The incentives  to innovate  and  differentiate  do  not  depend  
only on the  margin  depressing  mechanism  explored  by Steiner  (the Steiner  effect) but  
also  on  the  competitive  reaction  to  the  risk  of being  delisted  (delisting  effect). As a 
consequence  of this  risk,  manufacturers  face  even  stronger  incentives  to  adopt  non-
price strategies  of innovation  and  differentiation  in comparison  to those  predicted  by 
Steiner’s  analysis.  This  further  mechanism  is due  to the  fact  that  retailers  need  shelf 
space  for  stocking  their  private  labels  and  they  have  to  delist  some  manufacturer  
brands  to  obtain  it given  that  shelf  space  is a scarce  resource.  The  competition  for 
retailer’s shelf becomes  much  more  intense.
This  mechanism  of delisting  creates  a threshold  effect  which  increases  optimal  R&D 
and  advertising  expenditures.  The  intuition  is  that  the  incentives  to  innovate  and  
differentiate   are   not   only   due   to   Steiner’s   effect   but   also   to   the   threhold   effect 
associated  to the level of store  loyalty. 
We show that  vertical competition  may have positive effects  on the incentives  to adopt  
non- price   strategies.   With   asymmetric   firms   (brands),   an   increase   in   intensity   of 
vertical  competition  does  not  necessarily  lead  to higher  or lower  profits  for  all firms,  
but  forces  the  firms  willing  to  remain  sellers  of  branded  products  to  keep  brand  
loyalty of their  brands  at a level higher  than  retailer’ store  loyalty. And the only way to 
pursue  this  goal  and  avoid  to  be  involved  into  the  risk  of being  delisted  is to  boost  
brands.   
One further  prediction  of our  framework  is that  retailers  will be more  likely to replace  
second- tier   brands   with   private   labels   because   retailers   can   and   are   strongly  
incentived  to  delist  just  secondary  brands  given  that  they  obtain  on  these  brands  
lower margin  than  on tertiary- tier or fringe brands.  
We also  show  that  the  delisting  effect  becomes  stronger  over  time  to the  extent  that  
retailers  develop  stronger  and  stronger  store  brands.  To the  extent  that  consolidation,  
reputation,  and  store  loyalty  of retailers  tend  to  increase,  the  level of brand  loyalty 
which   firms   are   forced   to   reach   to   avoid   delisting   increases   as   well.   Thus,   the  
interaction  between  the  mechanism  of  delisting  and  the  evolution  of  private  labels  
determines   a   dynamic   process   which   may   finally   involve   even   the   strongest  
manufacturer  brands.  Finally, the  risk  of being  delisted  and  replaced  by private  labels  
may become  a real threat  for market  leaders  themselves. 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is organized  as  follows.  Section  2 gives  a brief  review  of  the 
relevant  literature  on  store  brands  and  vertical  competition.  Section  3  sets  up  the  
conceptual  framework.  In Section  4, we present  some  empirical  evidence  supporting  
our framework’s predictions.  Section  5 concludes.
2. Store brands  and vertical competition: background  and stylized  facts
Store  brands  have received  increased  attention  in recent  years.  Two key stylized  facts  
are  well- known  and  are increasingly  confirmed  by recent  patterns.  First, private  label 
products  are steadily increasing  their  market  share  and  retailers  are placing  a growing  
emphasis   on   branding   and  marketing   their  private   labels  (Senauer  and   Venturini, 
2005). These  brands  are  the  share  leaders  in several  food  product  categories  both  in 
the  United  States  and  Europe.  According  to  the  2005  report  from  ACNielsen  (The 
5Power  of Private  Label, 2005), “private  label items  made  up  17 percent  of total  value 
sales  for the  12 months  ending  the  first  quarter  of 2005, up  from  the  15 percent  level 
of the  previousACNielsen  report  in 2003. Private  label sales  increased  5 percent,  more  
than  double  the 2 percent  growth  rate of manufacturer  brands  (Tarnowski, 2005). 2
What’s  more,  private  labels  are  still expected  to  grow  although  it is difficult  to  say 
whether  their  worldwide  shares  will reach  those  of countries  as Switzerland,  Germany  
or Great  Britain, as well as it is difficult  to say whether  these  high- share  markets  have 
reached  their  peak.  At any rate,  the  key fact  is that  the  quantitative  dimension  of the 
private  label phenomenon  is clearly absolutely impressive. 
The  second  relevant  stylized   fact  is  that  retailers  are   expanding  their   brands  far 
beyond  the  initial  traditional  focus  on  low price  and  low quality.  In addition  to  the  
increase  in the  share  of private  label  sales,  there  is in fact  also  much  evidence  of a 
growing trend  towards  the development  of high quality private  labels. 3
This trend  confirms  that  private  label positioning  tends  to change  over  time. Initially, 
private  labels  are  weak  brands,  characterized  by a low brand  loyalty and  without  any 
innovative content,  just  a low price/lower  quality alternative to manufacturers’ brands.  
But over  time,  their  positioning  and  role  change  drastically. Today,  private  labels  are 
increasingly able to provide  the  quality once exclusively associated  with  manufacturer  
brands  and  their  quality  standards  continue  to  evolve.  More  recently,  retailers  have 
also  begun  to carry  premium  brands.  According  to a AcNielsen  (2005), the  growth  of 
premium  private  label  products  is  a  steady  trend.  Higher  quality  premium  private  
label, in fact, continue  to entry  and  the  price of private  label products  is now equal  to 
(or even higher  than) leading manufacturer  brands  in several product  categories. 
2 Europe  remains  the main  market  for private  labels sales, with a 23 percent  share. The 
top  five store  brands  markets  are  all in Europe: Switzerland,  at 45 percent;  Germany, 
at  30  percent;  Great  Britain,  at  28  percent;  Spain,  at  26  percent;  and  Belgium,  at  25 
percent.  The emerging  markets  of Croatia, the  Czech  Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and  
South  Africa collectively saw the  highest  private  label growth  rate  of 11 percent,  Latin 
America  and  Asia Pacific also  had  small  private  label  markets  in terms  of share,  but  
didn't  show  the  same  double- digit  growth  rates  as  in  the  other  emerging  markets.  
North  America  had  both  a high  share  (16 percent), and  a considerable  growth  rate  (7 
percent).
3 Increasingly, store  brands  offer  quality  at least  as good  as that  of the  so called  ‘big 
brands’. The perception  that  private  label brands  are a viable alternative  to big- name  
brands  is  well  documented  by  ACNielsen  (2005)  according  to  which  68  percent  of 
consumers  either  slightly  or strongly  agreed  with  the  statement  "Private  label brands  
are  a good  alternative  to  major  brands.  For  American  consumers,  store  brands  are 
brands  like any other  brands.  According  to Private  Label Manufacturing  Association,  a 
recent  study  by  The   Gallup  Organization  indicates  that  75  percent   of   consumers  
defined  store  brands  as  "brands"  and  ascribed  to  them  the  same  degree  of positive  
product  qualities  and  characteristics  -  such  as  guarantee  of  satisfaction,  packaging, 
value, taste  and  performance  -  that  they attribute  to national  brands.  Moreover, more  
than  90  percent  of  all  consumers  polled  were  familiar  with  store  brands,  and  83 
percent  said that  they purchase  these  products  on a regular  basis. 
6It is not  difficult  to explain  the  determinants  of these  stylised  facts.  There  is indeed  
theoretical  and  empirical  evidence  on  the  benefits  that  private  labels  offer  retailers. 
The  literature  documents  that  store  brands  typically  carry  higher  retailer  margins  in 
comparison   to   those   on   manufacturers’   brands   contributing   to   increase   retailers’ 
profits  (Mills, 1995; Ailawadi and  Harlam, 2004; Narasimhan  and  Wilcox 1998).
Moreover,   it   is   well- known   that   store   brands   enable   retailers   to   strengthen   their  
bargaining   position   vis- à- vis   manufacturers   of   national   brands.   In   general,   the 
bargaining  power  of the  retailer  is believed  to increase  as a result  of the  adoption  of 
store   brands   programs.   Store   brands   may   allow   the   retailer   to   negotiate   lower  
wholesale  prices  on  national  brands  leading  to  higher  unit  margins  on  the  national  
brands  (Mills 1995; Scott- Morton  and  Zettelmeyer  2001). 
Last   but   not   least,   private   labels   may   help   retailers   to   differentiate   their   stores,  
creating   store   loyalty   and   protecting   retailers   from   price   competition,   allowing 
potential  benefits  in terms  of increased  store  traffic and  store  revenues.  Retailers  can 
use  several  instruments  to  differentiate  their  stores.  They  can  increase  and  improve  
service,  extend  opening  hours,  enlarge  assortments.  But  all  these  measures  have  a 
limit: they  can  be cancelled  out  by competing  retailers.  Store  brands  are  an  effective  
instrument  of store  differentiation  just  because,  by definition,  they  are  store  specific 
(the other  competing  stores  cannot  carry  them), and  given  that  they are ‘brands’, they 
create  repeated  purchases  with  the  result  that  repeated  purchases  of  store  brands  
contribute  to develop  store  loyalty. 
Even   if   the   contribute   of   private   labels   to   chain   differentiation   is   not   yet   well 
documented,  there  is  empirical evidence  that  store  brands  represent  an effective way 
to create  store  loyalty  (Brady, Brown  and  Hulit, 2003). Corstjens  M. and  R. Lal (2000), 
through   a   game   theoretic   analysis,   show   that   quality   store   brands   can   be   an 
instrument  for  retailers  to  generate  store  differentiation  and  store  loyalty,  making  it 
more  costly  for  consumers  to  switch  stores.  Recent  empirical  research  suggests  that  
store  brands  increase  store  image  and  store  loyalty by improving  store  differentiation  
vis- à- vis other  retailers  .4 
Despite  the  growing  literature  on  the  phenomenon  of  private  labels,  one  topic  area  
regarding  the  impact  of vertical  competition  on  the  upstream  incentives  to  innovate  
and  differentiate  has  so far received  little attention.  An idea  often  put  forward  is that  
the  increasing  bargaining  power  of retailers  and  higher  vertical  competitive  pressures  
can have negative  effects  on upstream  incentives  to adopt  nonprice  strategies  such  as 
product  innovation  as well as horizontal  and  vertical product  differentiation  
The argument  is that  buyer  power  lowers  suppliers’ profits  inducing  them  to decrease  
R&D  expenditures   (see,   for   example,   Dobson,   2005;   and   Noll,   2005).   One   further  
argument  is that  since  technological  appropriability  conditions  are  very  weak  in the  
4 Corstjens  and  Lal (2000) empirical findings  indicate  that  store  brand  penetration  and  
the  resulting  differentiation  lead  to  increased  consumer  loyalty  for  the  four  major  
grocery  chains  in the  UK. Sloot  and  Verhoef  (2004) have  suggested  that  store  brands  
are  associated  with  higher  store  loyalty  though  other  researchers  argue  that  heavy 
users  of store  brands  are loyal to store  brands  in general, not  necessarily to the  store  
brand  of a particular  retailer  (Ailawadi and  Harlam,  2004). For the growing  importance  
of  retail  branding  and  its  ability  to  influence  customer  perceptions  and  drive  store  
choice and  loyalty, see Ailawadi and  Keller (2004).
7food  industry,  if private  labels  are  successful  in quickly imitating  new  products,  then  
they can reduce  rents  and  incentives  to innovation. (Galizzi and  Venturini, 2005).
Berges- Sennou  et  al.  (2004)  have  pointed  out  that  the  development  of private  labels  
could   change   the   share   of   profits   within   vertical   structures.   A   decrease   of 
manufacturers’  profits  of the  upstream  producers  could  lead  to less  innovation.  This 
mechanism  is reinforced  by the  strategy  of retailers  who develop  'me- too'‘products,  a 
strategy  which  can  be seen  as a substantial  free- riding  on research  and  development  
of new products”
Buyer power  may  force  food  manufacturers  to reduce  investment  in new products  or 
product  improvements,  advertising  and  brand  building  and  as  we have  seen  above, 
this  view is supported  by official reports  of the European  Commission  and  the Federal 
Trade  Commission.  
Significant  recent  advances  in the  analysis  of buyer  power  have, however  provided  a 
different  view. There  is now a small but  growing  theoretical  literature  which  examines  
formally the impact  of buyer  power  on the incentives  to innovate. Interestingly, Inderst  
and  Wey (2002) show  that  incentives  for  product  improvement  may  actually  increase  
with more  concentrated  buyers. Inderst  and  Shaffer  (2004) developed  a model  in which  
retail  mergers  increase  buyer  power  leading  to  a  reduction  in  product  variety  and  
social welfare. More recently, Inderst  and  Wey (2005), using  the axiomatic  approach  to 
bargaining  theory  show  that  the  presence  of buyer  power  need  not  necessarily reduce  
suppliers  incentives  to  innovate.  To  the  contrary,  it  may  increase  upstream  firms  
incentives.  This model, however, does  not  consider  the  existence  of private  labels  and  
delisting  decisions  along the lines developed  by the above framework.  
Weiss  and  Wittkopp  (2003,  2005) find  that  buyer  power  reduces  upstream  incentives  
to   introduce   new   products   in   a   sample   of   German   food   manufacturers.   But, 
interestingly, the  authors  also  find  that  the  negative  effect  of retailer’s buyer  power  is 
mitigated  if manufacturers  also  have  some  market  power.  In their  data,  firms  with  a 
large market  share  introduce  a significantly higher  number  of product  innovations.  
The theoretical  literature  on competition  and  innovation  is not  clear  about  the  effects  
of competitive  pressure  on a firm’s incentive  to invest  in product  innovations.  Indeed,  
competition  may  have  both  negative  and  positive  effects  on  innovation  incentives. 
Recent  research  has  focused  on  the  crucial  importance  of the  assumption  about  the 
degree  of firms  (brands)  heterogeneity.  A clear  theoretical  prediction  is that  a rise  in 
competitive  pressure  reduces  each  firm’s  profit  level and  makes  it less  attractive  to 
introduce  a new product  in an industry  with symmetric  firms.  However, the  realism  of 
the  symmetry  assumption  may be questioned  and  with  asymmetric  firms  the  outcome  
may   be   different.   For   example,   Boone   (2000)   argued   that   a   negative   impact   on 
innovation  is  less  likely  in  models  with  asymmetric  firms  in  which  the  source  of 
asymmetry  regards  not  only  efficiency  levels  but  also  the  firm’s  positioning  in  the  
product  space. With his words,  “if firms  invest  to explicitly position  their  products  [...] 
then  a rise in pressure  may make  it profitable  to move further  away from  the industry  
standard”  (p. 564). Boone (2001) shows  that  when  firms  are not  symmetric, an increase  
in intensity  of competition  does  not  necessarily lead  to higher  or lower  profits  for  all 
firms, but  forces  only the least  efficient  firms  out of the market.
In summary,  recent  theoretical developments  provide  useful  insights  about  the impact  
of buyer  power  on upstream  incentives.  Interestingly, this  literature  does  not  support  
the  hypothesis  of necessarily  negative  effects  but  suggest  that  the  issue  may be more  
8complex.  This  literature  emphasize  the  importance  of two  key analytical  features:  an 
approach  based  on  bargaining  theory  and  the  assumption  of asymmetric  firms.  One 
problem  is that  the  works  are not  well designed  to fully explore  the  specific nature  of 
buyer  power  in the vertical relationships  between  food  manufacturers  and  retailers. As 
a consequence,  they do not  providee  an appropriate  framework  to analyse  the specific 
mechanisms   at   work   in   a   competitive   environment   characterized   by   vertical 
competition.
In  whar  follows,  we  develop  a  framework  explicitly  designed  to  capture  the  main  
mechanisms  operating  in the  context  of vertical relationships  between  manufacturers  
and  retailers, after  the entry and  qualitative development  of store  brands.  
3. A two- stage  framework  with delisting
In this  section,  we investigate  how  store  brands  leading  to  higher  buyer  power  and  
vertical  competitive  pressure  may  indeed  not  reduce  upstream  incentives  to  product  
quality   and   innovation.   A  key  hypothesis   in   our   framework  is   that   manufacturer  
brands  are  asymmetric.  Let us  imagine  a world  of  asymmetric  firms,  with  different  
resources  and  capabilities  to develop  new products  and  brand  policies. But it may also 
be useful, as we will see, to assume  that  firms  have portfolios  of heterogeneous  brands  
in relation  to their  strength,  for example,  in terms  of brand  equity, loyalty, innovative  
content  and  degree  of differentiation.  Given  the  nature  of our  framework,  we do  not  
go into  details  of  specific  non- price  strategies.  We consider  all non- price  decisions  
(product  innovation  and  differentiation)  which  can  affect  the  strength  of a brand  and  
we measure  this strength  through  the notion  of brand  loyalty. 
3.1 The Steiner’s curve
More   than   two   decades   ago,   Robert   Steiner   developed   a   dual- stage   paradigm   to 
examine  vertical relationships  between  manufacturers  and  retailers  in consumer  goods  
industries  to  take  into  account  that,  contrary  to  the  implicit  assumption  of what  he 
called  the single- stage  approach,  which was then  and  in some  way still is the standard  
approach   in   economics   textbooks,   manufacturers   do   not   sell   direcly   to   final 
consumers  and  the retail industry  is not perfectly competitive. 5 
A key  prediction  of  Steiner’s  approach  is  the  existence  of  an  empirical  regularity  
between  the  retailer’s  margin  -  namely  the  difference  between  a brand’s  retail  price 
and  its factory  price -  and  the  strength  of a brand.  This margin  is not  fixed  and  equal  
among  competing  brands  but  reveals  a negative  association  with  brand  strength.  The 
stronger  the brand,  the lower is the retailer's  optimal  markup  over factory price. 6
5  Economic   research   has   often   oversimplified   the   vertical   relationships   between  
manufacturers  and  retailers  by assuming  that  retailers  are neutral  and  unable  to affect  
upstream  behavior.  Hence,  the  importance  of Steiner’s  approach.  For a recent  review 
and  assessment  of  Steiner’s  approach,  see  Gundlach  and  Foer  (2004)  as  well as  the  
papers  collected  in the Winter 2004  issue  of the Antitrust  Bulletin.
6 Alfred  Marshall  (1920) had  already  pointed  out  this  relationship.  For a review of the 
empirical   evidence   supporting   the   existence   of   a   significant   inverse   association  
between  brand  advertising  and  retail  margins,  see  also  Farris  and  Albion  (1980) and  
9The  reason  is  that  retailers  are  forced  to  stock  strong  brands  and  therefore  have 
relatively   less   bargaining   power   in   negotiating   their   wholesale   prices   with  
manufacturers.  In addition,  retailers’ markups  on these  brands  are strongly influenced  
by the  intensity  of  price  competition  among  retailers  (intrabrand  competition).  This  
competitive  pressure  is more  intense  on  strong  brands  since  consumers  select  these  
brands  to  form  their  perceptions  of  stores’  price  competitiveness  and  are  ready  to 
shift   to   lower   price   stores   if   retail   price   of   these   brands   is   not   perceived   as 
competitive.   Thus,   intensive   intrabrand   competitive   pressures   discipline   retailers’ 
price   decisions   on   strong   manufacturer   brands.   With   Steiner’s   words,   “   when  
consumers  are more  disposed  to switch  stores  within  brand  than  brands  within  store,  
the  manufacturer  dominates  his  retailers,  and  vice versa  when  consumers  are  more  
inclined  to switch  brands  within  store” (Steiner, 1984). Thus, while strong  brands  force 
retailers  to compete  vigorously  with each  other  and  to retail at a small margin, weaker  
and  fringe brands  do not  face similar  competitive price pressures. 7
While   Steiner   did   not   developed   a   formal   model,   his   ideas   contributed   to   the 
development   of   an   important   stream   of   analytical   models.   Recently,   Lal   and  
Narasimhan  (1996)  examined  the  stategic  impact  of  brand  advertising  on  margins  
utilizing  a game- theoretic  model.  Their  results  show  that  under  some  conditions  a 
manufacturer’s   advertising   can   lower   the   retail   margin   confirming   Steiner’s 
hypothesis.  Similar  results  are  reached  by other  recent  works  (Sethuraman  and  Tellis, 
2000; Ailawadi and  Harlam, 2004).
To develop  our  framework,  we begin  with  the  hypothesis  of an  inverse  relationship  
between  the  strength  of a brand  and  the  retailer’s margin.  It is easy to understand  the 
implications  of  the  Steiner’s  analysis  for  the  upstream  incentives  to  invest  in  non-
price  strategies.  The  margin- depressing  effect  has  key  implications  for  the  level  of 
advertising  and  R&D expenditures  to  build  brands.  To the  extent  that  manufacturer  
advertising  and  R&D affect  not  only final demand,  but  also  margins  at the  retail level 
(as  well  as  the  brand’s  retail  penetration  and  retailer’s  support  to  the  brand)  the  
effectiveness  of advertising  and  R&D will be  higher  than  in a single- stage  model.  In 
other  words,  if the  margin  depressing  impact  of nonprice  strategies  is additional  to 
their  direct  demand- creating  effect, manufacturers  face greater  incentives  to invest  in 
advertising  and  R&D to establish  and  maintain  strong  brands.  
Albion (1983).
7 It is important  to  note  that  according  to  the  theory  of derived  demand,  prices  and  
margins  at the  retail and  wholesale  (factory) level are  necessarily  perfectly  correlated  
for  both  view of advertising.  In other  words,  if advertising  leads  to increased  market  
power  through  product  differentiation,  both  wholesale  and  retail  prices  increase  and  
both  manufacturers  and  retailers  get higher  margins.  Alternatively, if advertising  does  
not   lead  to  higher  differentiation  and   brand  loyalty  but  spreads  information  and  
increases  price  elasticity,  then  both  wholesale  and  retail  prices  decrease  resulting  in 
lower  margins  at  both  levels.  By contrast,  according  to  the  Steiner’s  approach  it is 
possible  that  a  manufacturer’s  advertising  can  have  opposite  effects  on  wholesale  
price   elasticity   and   retail   price   elasticity   so   that   margins   can   move   in   opposite  
directions.
10Steiner  (1987)  developed  this  analysis  utilizing  the  notion  of  advertising  response  
function,  the  relationships  between  sales  and  advertising  input  and  assuming  the  
presence   of   a   threshold   level.8.  The   existence   of   a   threshold   level   in   the   sales-
advertising  relationship  is generally  supported  by empirical  evidence.  It means  that  
beneath  a certain  level there  is essentially  no  sales  response.  In other  words,  some  
positive  amount  of advertising  is necessary  before  any sales  impact  can  be detected.  
More  precisely,  the  advertising  response  function  is S-shaped,  convex  in advertising  
up to an inflection  point  after  which it is concave. 9 
Formally,   the   advertising   response   function   may   be   expressed   in   terms   of   the  
advertising  elasticity, defined  as the proportionate  rate  of change  in sales  with respect  
to  advertising  and  it is therefore  immediate  derive  the  implications  for  the  optimal  
advertising   expenditure.   Dorfman   and   Steiner   defined   the   standard   approach  
according  to which  the  joint  optimum  of price  (P) and  advertising  expenditure  (A) in 
the  case  of a monopolist  is given  by equality  of the  ratio  of advertising- to- sales  A/S 
(advertising  intensity) with  the  ratio  of the  advertising  elasticity  of demand,  eA, to the 
absolute  price  elasticity  of demand,  eP: A/S =  eA/e P, where  S =  PQ, and  Q denotes  the 
output  level.
On the basis of the condition  of Dorfman  and  Steiner, the optimal  advertising  intensity  
depends   on   how   increases   in   advertising   affect   the   firm's   cost   and   demand.The  
condition  simply states  that  more  advertising  will be undertaken  the more  profitable  it 
is.
If the  advertising  response  function  is S-shaped,  the  marginal  returns  to  advertising  
are increasing  for some  initial region  and  the advertising  elasticity is greater  the longer  
the  region  of increasing  returns  to advertsing.  Since advertising  expenditures  are  key 
determinants  of the  strength  of a brand  and  affect  the  brand's  retail penetration  and  
support,  as  well as  the  retailer’s  margin,  these  three  "dual  stage  effects"  increase  the  
advertising  effectiveness.  Therefore,  in a dual- stage  model  there  is a mechanism  at 
work   leading  to  extend  the   region   of  incresing   returns  to  advertising  (and  R&D). 
Therefore, advertising  elasticities  and  advertising  intensities  are
(eA)d >  (eA)s  Þ (A*/S)d >  (A*/S)s                                                                                          (1)
where  d  refer  to  dual- stage  and  s the  single- stage  model.  In other  words  in a dual-
stage  model, the  shape  and  position  of the  manufacturer’s  response  function  to non-
price   strategies   is   different   from   that   in   the   single- stage   one.   The   eA/eP   ratio  
characterizing  optimal  advertising  intensity  in  the  DS condition  is  increased  by  a 
factor  determined  by the  margin- depressing  impact  of advertising.  As a result,  on the 
basis  of  the  Dorfman- Steiner  condition,  a dual- stage  model  implies  higher  optimal  
advertising  and  R&D expenditures  (Steiner,  1973;  Albion,  1983;  Steiner,  1993).  The 
8 Following Steiner, here  we only focus  on advertising  but  clearly the same  analysis  can 
be extended  to the determinants  of all the expenditures  contributing  to the strengh  of 
a brand,  for example  R&D and  other  marketing  expenditures.
9  The   S-shaped   advertising   response   function   is   a   common   assumptiom   in   the  
advertising  literature.  Several economist  (see Comanor  and  Wilson, 1974; Porter, 1976; 
Arndt  and  Simon,1983)  claim  that  there  are  initial  increasing  returns  to  scale  for  
advertising.
11intuition  is that  the  margin  depressing  impact  of non- price strategies,  as well as their  
impact   on   retail   penetration   and   support   are   additional   to   their   direct   demand-
creating  effect. These  ‘dual- stage  effects’ increase  advertising  effectiveness  leading  to 
higher  advertising  (and R&D) expenditures.
3.2 Vertical competition  and delisting  decisions
The Steiner  effect  is an important  result  of Steiner’s  two- stage  analysis.  It provides  a 
crucial  building  block  for  our  framework.  However,  as  we  show  in  this  section,  it 
understates  the  true  effectiveness  of advertising  and  R&D expenditure  in a context  of 
vertical  competition.  In fact,  a drawback  of the  Steiner  model  is that  it neglects  the  
implications  of  retailers’  delisting  decisions.  Steiner  considers  the  impact  of  store  
brands  exclusively as a determinant  of retailer’s bargaining  power. As a consequences,  
his  approach  is unable  to  take  account  of the  full impact  of vertical  competition  on 
upstream  non- price strategies. 10
In what  follows,  we investigate  the  impact  of delisting  decisions  on  the  optimal  A/S 
ratio. We show  that  vertical competition  with  delisting  implies  an even  higher  optimal  
advertising  intensity then  that  predicted  by the Steiner  effect. 
Before  exploring  this  aspect,  we focus  on the  nature  of delisting  decisions.  Retailers’s 
delisting  decisions  are a new phenomenon  of increasing  relevance. According  to Prime 
Consulting  Group  (2001) delisting  is defined  as  “the  removal  or  discontinuation  of a 
product  from  stores  and  warehouses  as a retailer  originated  decision  strictly related  to 
the  introduction  of private  labels” (p. 4). In a competitive  environment  where  private  
labels  conquer  significant  market  shares  shelf  space  allocated  to  store  brands  has  
clearly to increase.  This means  that,  analytically, one cannot  neglect  the  fact that  shelf 
space  is a scarce  resource.  To make  room  for  their  brands  retailers  have  to decide  to 
delist  some  manufacturer  brands.  Whenever  a  retailer  decide  to  introduce  a  store  
brand,  it needs  to  decide  which  national  brand  to  take  off  the  shelf  in favor  of the  
store  brand.  The  consequence  is that  competition  for  retailer’s  shelf  becomes  much  
more  intense.  For this  reason,  in today’s   retailing  environment,  brand  delistings  is a 
common  practice.  Due  to  the  growth  of  private  labels,  the  shelf- space  allocated  to 
private  labels is reaching  vast dimensions.  11 
10  In  this  regard,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  Steiner  uses  a  definition  of  vertical  
competition  which  is different  from  the  notion  we adopt  here.  He refers  to  vertical  
competition  exclusively  in  terms  of  bargaining  power.  By ‘vertical  competition’,  we 
mean  a more  focused  notion  defined  as  the  competition  between  manufacturers  and  
retailers  brands.
11  There   is   evidence   that,   in   recent   years,   retailers   have   been   readjusting   their  
assortments   delisting   manufacturer   brands   as   the   market   share   of   store   brands  
increased.   For   example,   Euromonitor   signal   that   in   2003   Rewe,   Austria’s   largest  
grocery  retailer,  to  strengthen  its  private  label  sales  increased  the  shelf  space  for  its 
private  label  range.  To do  that  Rewe  streamlined  its  pet  food  portfolio,  delisting  a 
number  of branded  products  (www.euromonitor.com/pet  Food  and  Pet Care products  
in  Austria).  PLMA revealed  that  Auchan's  hypermarket  division  has  sent  a letter  to 
manufacturers  confirming  that  it will greatly reduce  the  number  of branded  products  
in its  stores  next  year.  Auchan  said  the  large  reduction  of brands  in its  stores  is the  
12This  leads  to  a topic  issue.  Consider  a retailer  who  decides  to  introduce  (or increase  
the   share   of)   its   private   labels.   The   question   we   seek   to   address   regards   the 
implications  of  this  decision  for  retailer’s  assortment.  Retailers  face  a complicated  
choice  in this  regard.  To make  room  for  their  store  brands  at  the  point  of sale, they  
have to readjust  their  assortments  delisting  some  manufacturer  brands.  Retailers  have 
to   choose   which   brands   to   delist.   Retailers   typically   offer   an   heterogeneous  
assortment  of manufacturer  brands,  with  brand  of different  strength  and  degree  of 
brand   loyalty   and   equity.   Strong   brands   enjoy   higher   perceived   quality,   brand  
preference,   and   brand   awareness   than   do   weak   brands.   That   enables   retailers   to 
charge  higher  prices  for  stronger  brands  (Keller  2002;  Aillawadi,  Lehman,  and  Neslin  
2003, Sloot and  Verhoef  (2004). 
But  the  strength  of  a  brand  not  only  affect  retailer’s  pricing  policy  but  also  does  
matter  for  delisting  decisions.  Consumers  react  differently  to  a delisting  of  a high-
equity  brand  than  they  do  to  a delisting  of a low- equity  brand.  Consumers  of high-
equity  brands  tend  to  be  more  committed  to  their  brand  which  makes  a  negative  
reaction  to a brand  delisting  more  likely (Sloot and  Verhoef, 2004).
3.3The Framework
In the  following  analysis, we incorporate  retailers’ delisting  decisions  into  a two- stage  
model.  We consider  a two- stage  framework  where  a common  retailer  sells  multiple  
brands  produced  by different  manufacturers.  There  are N manufacturers  and  each one 
offers  one  or more  brands  so that  the  total  number  of brands  is M >  N. It is assumed  
that  advertising  as  well as  R&D expenditures  have  a positive  impact  on  brand  equity  
and  loyalty. Brands  are asymmetric  and  there  is a metric  allowing  a ranking  of brands  
by  brand  loyalty.  This  brand  rank  is  shown  on  the  horizontal  axis.    To  keep  the  
analysis  as  simple  as  possible,  we  assume  that  manufacturers  do  not  compete  in 
prices  in the retail stage. Each manufacturer  is assumed  to decide  advertising  and  R&D 
level while wholesale price for its brand  is negotiated  with the retailer. The retailer  sets  
the retail prices. 
result  of strong  growth  of the discounters  as well as the expansion  of private  label and  
economy  lines.  Despite  the  empirical  relevance  of  the  phenomenon  of delisting,  the  
issue  is still absolutely  underresearched.  For a first  attempt  to  modelling  a retailer’s 






p, wFig. 1 Retailer’s margin  as a function  
            of brand  loyalty
The  ‘Steiner  curve’, as  an  inverse  relationship  between  the  retailer’s  margin  and  the  
strength  of  a brand  (measured  by  its  degree  of  brand  loyalty), is the  first  building  
block  of our  framework  and  is depicted  in Fig. 1) where  RM =  p – w is the  retailer’s  
margin.  The  retailer  receives  the  margin  p- w per  unit  of sales.  Manufacturer's  brand  
advertising  exerts  a margin  depressing  effect.  Accordingly,  retailers  sell  the  leading  
advertised   brands   at   narrower   margins.   As   indicated   previously,   this   permits  
manufacturer   to   enjoy   increasing   returns   to   advertising   in   the   dual- stage  
advertising/sales  response.  
Suppose  now  that  the  retailer  is active  in  launching  and  selling  private  labels.  The 
retailer  tries  to  keep  its  customers  loyal  to  its  stores  and  to  this  purpose  launches  
private  label  programs.  Following  Scott  Morton  and  Zettelmeyer  (2004),  we assume  
that  the  retailer’s  shelf  space  is  a limited  and  scarce  resource.  Clearly,  the  retailer  
needs  shelf  space  for stocking  its private  labels. To obtain  it, the  retailer  has  to delist  
some  manufacturers’ brands.
Strong  brands,  and  firms  with  a portfolio  of strong  brands,  are  able  to  face  vertical 
pressures   better   than   weak   brands.   The   reason   is   that   in   making   shelf- space  
decisions,  the retailer  will rank  manufacturers’ brands  in relation  to their  strength  (e.g. 
brand  loyalty) and  will compare  the  brand  loyalty  (BL) of each  brand  to the  retailer’s 
own store  loyalty (SL). 
Retailers  would  like delisting  strong  brands  given  that  the  retailer’s  margin  on  these  
brands  is lower.  The  problem  is that  strong  brands  can  contrast  vertical  pressures  
better  than  weaker  brands  and  cannot  be  delisted.  In making  shelf- space  decisions,  
rational  retailers  will  recognise  that  they  can  delist  only  the  brands  whose  brand  
loyalty is lower than  their  store  loyalty. On the  contrary, retailers  cannot  delist  brands  
for  which  brand  loyalty  is greater  than  store  loyalty. This  implies  that  manufacturer  
brands   operate   in   a   two- region   environment.   We   refer   to   these   two   regions, 
respectively, as the  ‘listing  region’ (L), and  the  ‘delisting  region’ (D). The demarcation  
point  between  them  is given by the level of retailer’s store  loyalty (Fig. 2). 
The retailer  can delist  brands  whose  brand  loyalty is lower than  retailer’s store  loyalty. 
This possibility arises  because, in the case of ‘weak’ brands,  consumers  are more  likely 
to  switch  brands  within  the  store  than  to  switch  the  store.  Thus,  retailers  can  delist  
these   brands   since   that   has   only   a   minor   impact   on   their   sales.   Hence,   a 
manufacturer’s  brand  characterized  by BL <  SL risks  to be delisted.  On the  contrary, 
retailers  cannot  delist  brands  for  which  BL >  SL because  of  losing  sales  caused  by 
consumers   who   remaining   loyal   to   their   preferred   brands   go   and   by   them   in 
competing  stores.  The switching  behavior  of consumers  and  their  propensity  to switch  
stores   is   affected   by   the   strength   of   a   brand.   This   means   that   it   is   vital   for  
manufacturers  willing  to  remain  sellers  of  branded  products  to  build  and  maintain  
brands  strong  enough.  Precisely, they have to keep  BL of their  brands  at a level higher  
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Brand  Loyalty (BL)than  retailer’s SL. And  the  only way to pursue  this  goal and  avoid  to be involved  into  
the  risk of delisting  is to boost  brands  through  greater  investments  in advertising  and  
R&D. By building  brand  equity,  manufacturers  can  strengthen  their  brand  to  such  a 
level that  retailers  would  have difficulty delisting  it. Thus  brand  equity determines  not  
only  the  price- premium  that  consumers  are  willing  to  pay  and  the  manufacturer’s  
bargaining   power   when   negotiating   buying   conditions   with   retailers,   but   also   the  
retailer’s delisting  decisions.  
                                                                      SL
                                                   Fig. 2  The Steiner’s curve and
                                                               the delisting  mechanism
The main  point  of Figure 2 is that  the mechanism  of delisting  and  the existence  of two 
distinct  regions,  in only one of which  advertising  is effective implies  the existence  of a 
strong  threshold  effect in addition  to the ‘dual- stage’ effects  identified  by Steiner. 
As we have seen  above, it is well established  that  advertising  threshold  levels influence  
the   shape   of   the   advertising   response   function,   and   thereby   affect   the   optimal  
advertising  expenditure.  In a world  with  delisting, for a sufficiently  high  store  loyalty, 
in addition  to the  margin- depressing  effect  captured  through  the  Steiner  curve, there  
is a further  factor  at work affecting  advertising  and  R&D effectiveness.
Conceptually,  the  level  of  store  loyalty  defines  the  minimum  level  of  brand  loyalty 
required  by retailers  to list  a brand  and  therefore  it determine  the  minimum  level of 
advertising  and  R&D one  manufacturer  has  to undertake  to maintain  its brand  in the 
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DelistingRegionloyalty  beneath  which  it is impossible  for  the  manufacturer  to have  sale  response  to 
non- price   strategies   expenditurers.   The   existence   of   delisting   means   that   higher  
advertising   and   R&D   expenditures   increases   the   probability   of   surpassing   the  
threshold  and  allow the  firm  (brand)  to operate  in the  no- delisting  region.  A specific 
store  loyalty  threshold.  works  as  an  all- or  nothing  divide.  Being  above  the  critical 
threshold  of  store  loyalty  is crucial  if a brand  manufacturer  intends  to  continue  to 
operate  as such. This minimum  level of brand  loyalty implies  that  advertising  and  R&D 
could  be useless  and  unprofitable  below the  ‘threshold  level’ identified  by the  level of 
store  loyalty  which  therefore  determines  the  minimum  level of advertising  and  R&D 
investment  to build a brand  that  could  be listed. 
In other  words,  from  the  point  of view of a manufacturer,  it is not  enough  to have  a 
brand  somewhere  along  the  X-axis. It is also  necessary  to  make  sure  that  the  brand  
surpasses  the  critical  threshold  of store  loyalty  to  be  positioned  in the  no- delisting  
region. Hence, the  incentive  to build  a stronger  brand  enjoys  double  benefits  in terms  
of higher  retail margins  and  lower risk of delisting.
Focusing  again  on  advertising  for  simplicity  as  in  the  (1) above,  the  existence  of  a 
threshold  level due to delisting  implies  that, at a sufficiently high level of store  loyalty, 
there  is a larger  region  of advertising  increasing  returns,  hence  a greater  advertising  
effectiveness  and  optimal  advertising  intensity  than  in the  Steiner’s model. Therefore,  
we obtain: 
(A*/S)dd   >  (A*/S)d >(A*/S)s                                                             (2)
where  (A*/S)dd is the advertising  intensity  in a dual- stage framework  with delisting.
In other  words,  the effectiveness  of advertising  and  R&D is even higher  in a two- stage  
framework  with  delisting  since  non- price  strategies  of innovation  and  differentiation  
not  only  allow  to  obtain  the  Steiner  effect  of a lower  retailer’s  margin  but  they  also  
allow  the  manufacturer  brand  access  to  retailer’s  shelf  space.  The  ideas  of Figures  1 
and  2 can thus  be summarized  in the following proposition:
Proposition   1:  Vertical   competition   with   delisting   decisions   creates   a   further  
mechanism  in addition  to the margin- depressing  effect  (the ‘Steiner  effect’), leading  to 
even   greater   upstream   incentives   to   adopt   non- price   strategies   of   innovation   and  
differentiation. 
But Figure  2 makes  an  additional  point.  One  key consequence  of this  mechanism  is 
that  retailers  looking  for  room  to  allocate  their  private  labels  will be  more  likely  to 
replace  lower- tier  brands  with  private  labels.  In  other  words,  leading  brands  will 
continue  to  be  stocked  by  retailers  as  a consequence  of  their  nature  of  must- have 
brands,  but  retailers  will be more  likely to replace  lower- tier brands.
Retailers  are  then  motivated  to  substitute  secondary  brands  the  brands  with  lowest  
margin  in  the  delisting  region.  Less  well- known  manufacturer's  brand,  or  tertiary  
brands,  are  relatively  in  a  safer  position  given  that  the  retailer’s  margin  on  these  
brands  is higher  than  that  of secondary  brands.
Thus, we have the following proposition:
16Proposition  2: Rational retailers optimizing  shelf- space allocation will be more  likely to  
replace second- tier manufacturer  brands  with  private  labels because  these brands  can  
be delisted  and  the margins  retailers obtain  on secondary  brands  are lower than  those  
on tertiary- tier or fringe brands. 
What happens  if over time  the  higher  quality of store  brands  results  in an increase  of 
store  loyalty? A well defined  stylized  fact, as we have seen  in section  2, is that  private  
label positioning  tends  to change  over time. Today  private  labels  are increasingly able 
to provide  the quality once exclusively associated  with higher  quality premium  brands.  
As a consequence,  they are more  likely to compete  with the market  leader  as well. This  
notion  of store  brand  evolution  has  relevant  implications  which  our  framework  allows 
to analyse  very easily. 
The consequences  of a higher  level of store  loyalty are illustrated  in Fig. 3. The initial 
equilibrium  is given by point  A. An increase  in the degree  of store  loyalty, for example  
as  a consequence  of more  sophisticated  store  brands,  which  is illustrated  by a shift  
outward  of the line from  SL to SL’, changes
                                                                      SL                 SL’       Brand  Loyalty (BL)
                                                
Fig. 3 The delisting  mechanism
                                                           and  the increase  of store  loyalty
the  equilibrium  into  A’. As a consequence,  the  region  of delisting  (region  D) become  








Region Dbrands  that  where  previously  protected  by the  risk  of delisting  are  now  involved  in 
delisting  decisions.  This means  that  the  delisting  effect  tend  to become  stronger  over 
time. To the extent  that  retailers  boost  their  non- price strategies  and  develop  stronger  
and  stronger  store  brands.  In other  words,  if over  time  SL increases,  then  the  level of 
BL to avoid delisting  increases  as well. 
Thus, the  interaction  between  the  mechanism  of delisting  and  the  evolution  of private  
labels  determines  a dynamic  process  which  may  finally involve  the  entire  ranking  of 
brands  in the  likelihood  of delisting.  To the  extent  that  consolidation,  reputation,  and  
store  loyalty  of  retailers  tend  to  increase,  even  the  number  two  and  three  in  each  
category  may  find  themselves  pushed  off the  shelf. Brands  which  are  not  leading  are 
increasingly confronted  with  the  risk of being delisted  and  replaced  by  private  labels. 
As vertical  competitive  pressures  grow, even  major  food  manufacturers  may  face the 
risk   of   delisting.   Finally,   store   brands   may   become   a   threat   for   market   leaders  
themselves. Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition  3: To the  extent  that  store loyalty  increases, even  the  strongest  brands  in 
each  category  (i.e. the  number  two  and  three)  are  confronted  with  the  risk  of being  
delisted and replaced by  private labels. 
4. Empirical evidence  and managerial implications
This   section   examines   some   empirical   patterns   and   evidence   supporting   the   key 
predictions  of the  above framework.  The first  prediction  of our  conceptual  framework  
is   that   vertical   competition   increases   upstream   incentives   to   adopt   non- price 
strategies.  In such  competitive  environments,  product  innovation  and  differentiation  
become  more  and  more  crucial strategies. 
This   prediction   is   well   supported   by   Boston   Consulting   Group’s   advice   to 
manufacturers  in front  of the  rise  of private  labels.  In fact,  the  advice  is to invest  in 
brands  with  advertising,  promotion,  and  merchandising  and  push  a steady  stream  of 
new products  to create  an appropriate  level of brand  loyalty. As noted  by Brady et al. 
(2003),   this   advice   is   based   on   the   evidence   that   private   label   development   is 
negatively affected  by investments  in innovation  brand  equity so that  building  a brand  
with  strong  customer  loyalty  as  well  as  continuous  innovation  is  one  of  the  best  
defenses  against  private  labels (Brady, Brown and  Hulit, 2003).
Several recent  works  have documented  that  product  innovation  is one of the strongest  
competitive  weapons  against  private  label  for  manufacturers  (Galizzi  and  Venturini, 
2005; Ball. 2004a; Floricel and  Miller, 2003; McTaggard,  2004). An explicit link between  
vertical  competition  and  pressure  to innovate  is pointed  out  by Ball et al. (2004) who  
write:   “Marketers   of   everything   from   pet   food   to   to   soft   drinks   feel   pressure   to 
innovate, for a variety of reasons.  Powerful retailers  […] are quicker  than  ever to pull a 
lagging   product   off   their   shelves,   sometimes   substituting   their   own   private- label 
version”. Cullen and  Whelan  (1997) find  that  “the rate of new product  introductions  by 
dominant  brands  increased  over the period  1988  to 1993  [..and  this] not  only reflect  a 
firms’s ability to innovate  but  also reflect  a strategy to dominate  shelf space”
It should  also be noted  that  our  framework  is consistent  with  the increasing  emphasis  
on   product   innovation   in   food   manufacturing.   Food   markets   are   increasingly  
18characterized  by  relevant  flows  of  innovative  products.  For  example,  Rogers  (2000) 
noted  that  the  number  of new products  introductions  in the  U. S. rose  from  4,540  to  
12,400  items  in the  period  1983- 1997.  In a recent  study  based  on  a large  survey  of 
3500   European   food   manufacturing   firms   undertaken   in   1996- 7,   Traill   and  
Meulemberg  (2002) found   that  according  to a score  for top  ten  sources  of competitive  
advantage,  ‘new product  development’ (NPD) resulted  the third  most  important  source  
of competitive  advantage,  immediately  after  ‘high  quality  product’  and  ‘efficiency  in 
production’.   The   survey   also   shows   that   manufacturers   interviewed   expected   an 
increasing  importance  of product  innovation  in the  next  five years.  In fact, NPD was  
expexted  to become  the  second  most  important  source  of competitive  advantage  after  
‘high quality product’.
While this  evidence  cannot  be considered  a rigorous  test  of our  prediction,  it provides  
strong  indications  that  despite  the  increasing  concentration  and  bargaining  power  of 
retailers,  food  manufacturers  are  not  less  oriented  to  innovate.  On the  contrary,  the  
focus  on innovation  may be even stronger.  12
There  is also  evidence  that  second- tier  brands  face the  strongest  vertical  competitive 
pressure   (our   second   prediction).   The   fact   that   secondary   brands   are   particularly 
vulnerable  in  an  environment  of  vertical  competition  and  that  store  brands  harm  
seriously  second- tier  manufacturer  brands,  is supported  by several  empirical  results.  
For  example,  Cullen  and  Whelan  (1997)  provide  empirical  findings  supporting  this  
prediction   in   their   analysis   of   fast   moving   consumer   goods   (FMCG)  industries   in 
Ireland.   They   find   that   the   competitive   position   of   leader   brands   improved  
considerably  over  the  period  1982- 1993,  while many  second  tier  mass  market  brands  
have   become   ‘trapped’   in   an   accelerating   downward   spiral   in   market   share.   The 
development  of high  quality  store  brands  resulted  particularly  damaging  to the  third,  
fourth  and  fifth  brands  in each market.
They also find  that  while total advertising  expenditure  increased  significantly  over the  
period,  fewer  brands  were  actually  spending  on  traditional  mass- market  advertising  
methods.   In   particular,   manufacturer   advertising   concentration   increased   since 
dominant  brands  advertised  more  intensely  while  the  advertising  levels  of  trapped  
brands  declined.  
The reason  why several  second- tier  brands  result  so vulnerable  is easy to understand  
in the  context  of our  framework.  These  brands  are  forced  to reduce  their  advertising  
expenditure  levels  just  when  an  escalation  of  commitment  to  advertising  would  be 
necessary  in order  to avoid delisting. 
12 Vertical pressures  leading  to higher  R&D, marketing  and  advertising  costs  mean  that  
vertical competition  can become  a significant  source  of endogenous  sunk  costs  for the  
food  industry  with  far  reaching  implications  for  firm’s  size  and  market  structure.  It 
may determine  higher  levels of market  concentration  given that  higher  levels of output  
may be needed  to amortize  increased  endogenous  fixed costs.  Larger  firms  are able to 
spread  these  endogenous  fixed  costs  over  more  units  of output  enjoing  larger  scale 
conomies   at   the   firm   level  (Galizzi   and   Venturini,   1996).   This   hypothesis   seems  
supported  by recent  structural  changes  in the  U.S. and  EU where  food  industries  have  
been  characterized  by processes  of consolidation  and  concentration  (Gilpin and  Traill, 
1999; Cotterill, 2000; Rogers, 2001). 
19On the  basis  of these  empirical results,  Cullen  and  Whelan  (1997) argued  that  there  is 
a future  only  for  Euro-  or  global  brands,  while  national  brand  manufacturers  with 
brands   ranked   third   or   fourth   in   FMCG  markets   are   faced   with   the   prospect   of 
continuous  share  erosion  or the  choice to specialise  either  as niche  brands  or possibly 
as private  label suppliers.  
Similarly, Dobson  et al. (2002) pointed  out  that   “the  leading  suppliers  appear  better  
able  to resist  retailer  pressure  to reduce  prices.  In contrast  smaller  producers,  either  
producing   secondary   brands   or   own- label   products   are   less   able   to   resist   such  
pressures  and  transfer  prices  appear  much  closer  to  competitive  levels.  The  same  
authors  refer  to the risk of being delisted  as a typical risk of powerless  suppliers.
The   differential   impact   of   store   brands   in   relation   to   the   manufacturer   brand’s  
strength  is confirmed  by the  literature  on price effects  of private  labels. Several works  
in this  stream  of literature  indeed  show  that  while premium- tier  national  brands  are 
relatively   insulated   from   store   brands   entry,   consumers   of   lower- priced   national  
brands  are  more  likely  to  switch  to  store  brands  (Blattberg  and  Wisniewski  1989, 
Sethuraman  et al. 1999). In particular, and  more  consistently  with our  prediction,  store  
brands  are more  more  likely to compete  with  second- tier  brands  than  with  premium-
tier  national  brands  (Dhar  and  Hoch,  1997;  Hoch  and  Lodish,  2003).  Pauwels  and  
Srinivisan   (2004)   indicate   that   manufacturers’   premium   brands   do   not   directly 
compete  with  store  brands,  but  instead  focus  on serving  their  core  quality- conscious  
consumer  segments  by  investing  in  product  innovations.  In contrast,  store  brands  
harm  second- tier manufacturers  brands  because  consumers  of these  brands  are more  
likely  to  switch  to  store  brands.  They  also  find  that  that  premium  national  brands  
maintain  their  sales  level whereas  second  price- tier  brands  lose  market  share  to  the  
store  brand.  
Market  access  is becoming  particularly  difficult  for  second- tier  brands  which  tend  to 
become  squeezed  between  the brands  characterized  by high brand  loyalty and  tertiary  
brands  (Harrison,  2000). Few claims  illustrate  these  patterns  and  the  mechanisms  at 
work  as the  following  words  by Niall FitzGerald,  then  cochairman  of Unilever: ”I don’t 
see Wal- Mart as a threat.  I see Wal- Mart as a positive  opportunity,  just  as I see Tesco  
and  Carrefour  as  an  opportunity.  They’re  a  positive  opportunity  for  the  relatively 
small number  of people  who  have  the  big brands  (...)What  the  Wal- Marts,  Tescos  and  
Carrefours   need   are   big   brands   that   drive   traffic.   What   they   don’t   need   are   the 
secondary  brands,  the  No. 3, 4, 5 and  6. You have  to  be positioned  with  the  leading  
brands  in each  category  the  consumers  demand  or  the  dominant  brands  in a niche  
category”(Ball, 2004b, p. A7). 
The  increasing  intensity  of  vertical  competition  and,  as  a consequence,  the  need  to 
have  a  portfolio  of  strong  brands  in  order  to  maintain  an  appropriate  bargaining  
power  with retailers  explain  why even major  manufacturers  have increasingly adopted  
in  recent  years  refocusing  strategies  to  reinforce  their  core  brands  eliminating  less  
successful  ones.  Indeed,  in the  U. S., food  manufacturers  tend  to concentrate  on their 
core  activities  and  to  consolidate  their  positions  in markets  and  product  categories  
where  they currently hold  a strong  position  (Cotterill, 2000; Rogers, 2001). 
Similar  patterns  can  be observed  in Europe  where  there  is evidence  that  most  brands  
fail to  achieve  the  necessary  brand  loyalty.  Recent  estimates  indicate  that  no  fewer  
than  75 per  cent  of all European  brands  are  under  pressure.  More or less, this  means  
20that  only  the  25  percent  of European  brands  have  sufficient  critical  mass  to  sustain  
appropriate  marketing  efforts  (Jones, McLaughlin and  van Ossel, 2002). 
According   to   the   Private   Label   Manufacturers’   Association   (PLMA)   “Leading  
manufacturer  brands  are  struggling  to  maintain  their  market  share  positions  and  
profitability   in   Europe   in   the   face   of   growing   private   label   competition.   There   is 
evidence  that  several firms  have adopted  refocusing  strategies  by reducing  the number  
of  brands  in  their  portfolio.  For  example,  in  recent  years  Unilever  has  adopted  a 
drastic  restructuring  of its  portfolio  by selling  or  eliminating  1,200  brands,  reducing  
the  number  of brands  in portfolio  to 400. The purpose  was an effort  to become  more  
focused,  lean and  competitive. As noted  by the CEO, in the absence  of this strategy  “[if 
we]were still trundling  around  with 1,600 brands  as the retail continues  to consolidate,  
we   would   be   dead   in   the   water”   (Ball,   2004b).   ConAgra   Foods   Inc.   unveiled   a 
turnaround  strategy  oriented  to  simplify  the  portfolio  and  that  includes  boosting  
annual  marketing   spending   focusing   on   brands   with   the   highest   potential  (Lloyd, 
2006).
Industry  analysts  emphasize  that  “Anything  but  the  top  brands  can  end  up  on  the 
bottom  shelf.  The  big food  companies  don’t  want  to  be in categories  where  they  are 
relegated  to the  worst  display, and  they are finding  they can’t always  manage  the  vast  
array   of   brands   they   have   collected.   So   they   are   selling   […]  Nestlé   merger- and-
acquisitions   team   was   more   focused   on   divestitures   of   small   business   than  
acquisitions.   Food- company   executives   are   now   talking   about   to   “simplify”   their 
portfolios  […] What  really  matters  is how  big  you  are  in a particular  category,  and  
being a star  in one aisle doesn’t guarantee  respect  in another”  (Ellison, 2004).
The   existence   of   specific   difficulties   for   secondary   brands   may   also   explain   the 
difficulties  of medium- sized  manufacturers.  Rogers  (2001)  found  that:  “[In the  U. S. 
food  industry  t]he 100  largest  food  and  tobacco  processors  accounted  for  about  75% 
of the  value- added  in 1997,  almost  doubling  their  share  since  1954.  The  top  100  is 
itself  skewed  toward  the  very large, with  the  top  20 firms  accounting  for  over  50% of 
total  value- added  in 1997,  more  than  doubling  its  1967  share  (…). The remaining  80 
firms  among  the  top  100 firms  actually lost  share  over the  last  30 years. The sector  is 
best  described  by  a  big- small  model,  where  extremely  large  firms  control  leading  
positions  in  most  markets  and  smaller  companies,  including  startups,   operate  in  a 
competitive  fringe  trying  to  serve  a particular  market  niche  or  develop  a new  idea 
…”(pp. 5- 6). 
Finally, it is interesting  to note  that  there  is also  empirical  support  for  Proposition  3, 
namely  that  over  time,  because  on  the  increasing  level of store  loyalty, an  increasing  
number  of brands,  even the strongest  ones, face intense  vertical pressures  and  the risk  
of  delisting.  For  example,  Brady,  Brown  e Hulit  (2003)  noted  that  in  countries  and  
categories  where  vertical  competition  is more  developed,  even  brands  in number  one 
or two position  face the  risk  of delisting.  There  is indeed  evidence  that  where  vertical 
competition  is more  intense,  even brands  in number  one or two position  face this risk. 
Steiner  (2004) quoting  Berlinski  (1997), pointed  out  that,  over  time, it will be possible  
to see only two offerings  per  category  on the  shelf – the national  brand  leader  and  the  
store  brand.  There  will be no  space  available  for  the  second  or  third  brand  player  in 
the category”. 
It is important  to  note  that  a scenario  in which  retailers  carry  a private  label  plus  a 
national  brand  plus  a local brand  would  mean  the final collapse  of second- tier brands.  
21This  could  lead  to  the  fear  that  while  the  leading  firms  face  greater  incentives  to 
innovate  and  differentiate  in a world  of vertical  competition  with  delisting,  the  result  
might  be  a reduction  of  dynamic  efficiency  given  the  decreasing  number  of  leading  
brand  manufacturers.  In fact, the  collapse  of second- tier  brands  implies  that  only the  
leader  would  survive. 13
However,  in  this  regard,  a countervailing  factor  is at  work.  The  fact  is that  private  
labels   themselves   tend   to   become   an   increasingly   important   vehicle   of   product  
innovation  and  quality products.  Retailers  themselves, in other  words,  are increasingly  
involved  in the  process  of  food  product  innovation  and  differentiation.  Given  their  
size, resources  and  capabilities, retailers  are increasingly able to play several  strategic  
functions.  They tend  to externalize  several functions  such  as production  and  logistics, 
but   internalize   the   functions   related   to   innovation  such  as   product   development,  
design  and  quality  management,  marketing  and  branding  (Dawson,  2001). The reason  
is   that   retailers   are   in   a   unique   position   to   obtain   precious   data   on   customer  
preferences  and  purchasing  patterns  at  the  point  of  sale  and  these  data  give  them  
access  to information  that  can be utilized  to directly initiate  aspects  of NPD and  build  
innovation  networks  as shown  by Cox, Mowatt  and  Prevezer  (2003). 
Traill   and   Muelemberg   (2002)   find   that   private   level   suppliers   introduce   a   large 
number   of   new   products.   Their   survey   data   show   that   private   level   suppliers  
introduced  the  largest  number  of  new  products  even  if these  new  products  are  not  
highly  innovative.  Particularly  in  fresh  foods,  private  label  products  have  taken  the 
lead   in   addressing   the   major   consumer   trends   and   needs.   For   example,   there   is 
evidence   that   ready  meals  and   organic  food   are   now   dominated   by   private  label 
products   and   product   innovation   increasingly   comes   from   private   labels   (Jones, 
McLaughlin and  van Ossel, 2002). 
In  sum,  the  empirical  evidence  examined,  although  often  rather  anecdotal  and/or  
mainly  based  on  industry  analysts’  findings,  tends  to  support  the  predictions  of the 
framework   here   developed.   The   framework   predicts   that   upstream   suppliers   face 
greater   pressures   to   innovate   and   differentiate   and   that   these   pressures   are 
endogenous  to the  strategic  role played  by retailers.  These  predictions  are  consistent  
with  the  empirical  patterns  observed.  It is imp  Their  most  robust  empirical  results  
13  In  trhis  sense,  our  framework  provides  a  simple  context  to  focus  on  a  specific 
version  of  the  idea  developed  in  the  strategic  management  literature  according  to 
which  it may  be a serious  strategic  error  for  a firm  to become  ‘stuck  in the  middle’. 
The   concept   has   been   developed   by   Porter   who   argued   that   firms   must   choose  
between  either  a differentiation  or  a cost  leadership  strategy.  A firm  which  remains  
'stuck   in   the   middle'   between   these   two   strategies   will   result   unable   to   achieve  
competitive  advantage  (Porter,  1985,  1990). One  criticism  of the  hypothesis  was  that  
firms   can   often   combine   low   cost   with   differentiation.   Indeed,   there   is   empirical 
evidence  that  successful  firms  have  both  very low production  costs  and  a reputation  
for high quality 
Our  framework  show  that  a specific  version  of this  hypothesis  might  be particularly  
appropriate   in   the   context   of   a   competive   environment   characterized   by   vertical 
competition,  in the sense  that  in this environment  firms  have to avoid for their  brands  
a future  of  secondary  brands  ‘stuck  in the  middle’ if they  wish  to  survive  as  brand  
sellers. 
22regards  the  positive  correlation  between  brand- name  prices  and  the  share  of private-
label  goods.  But indeed,  this  is clearly  predicted  by the  hypothesis  of upgrading  and  
increasing  vertical diffentiation   so that  this  evidence  support  one  of the  stylized  fact 
predicted  by our  framework.  
ortant  to note  that  these  empirical  patterns  are  substantially  similar  what  Ward  et al. 
(2002)  refer  to  as  the  “conventional  industry  wisdom”,  namely  the  idea  that  brand  
manufacturers  “defend  their  brands  against  private- label  products  by lowering  their  
prices,  engaging  in additional  promotional  activities,  and  increasingly  differentiating  
their  products  [..and  that]  the  second- tier  national  brands  [are] particularly  hard  hit 
[by the growth  of private  labels]”. Ward et al. (2002), however, introduce  a caveat  about  
this  conventional  wisdom  arguing  that  these  facts  fail a more  rigorous  empirical  test.  
Their empirical results  show that  many of these  stylized  facts  are not  corrently true. In 
particular,  they find  that  larger  private- label share  leads  to higher  brand- name  prices, 
there   is   a   pronounced   downward   trend   in   promotional   activities   and   that  
differentiation  does  not  increase  with vertical competition.  
Clearly,  this  last  result  would  not  support  our  prediction.  However,  the  measure  of 
differentiation  they use  – the  number  of items  per  firm  – does  not  seem  a good  proxy 
for true  differentiation.  
Their   most   robust   empirical   result   regards   the   positive   correlation   between  
manufacturer  brand  prices  and  the  share  of private- label  goods.  But indeed,  this  is 
clearly predicted  by the  hypothesis  of upgrading  and  increasing  vertical  diffentiation  
as  a consequence  of  vertical  competition.  In fact,  there  is now  increasing  empirical  
evidence  supporting  the  hypothesis  that  premium- tier  national  brands  could  build  on 
their  strength  by  introducing  high- end  product  varieties,  which  increases  average  
brand  price  (Pauwels  and  Srinivasan,  2004;  Gruca  et  al. 2001;  Hauser  and  Shugan,  
1983).   Similar   findings   are   provided   by   Bontems   et   al.   (2005)   who   examined   the 
changes  in  national  brand  product  characteristics  induced  by  the  development  of 
private  labels. They distinguish  between  three  types  of private  labels  (low price, “me-
too”  and  high  quality  private  labels.  Their  results  indicate  that  the  effect  of private  
label  expansion  is different  according  to  the  type  of the  private  label.  Interestingly, 
they show  that  the increase  in national  brand  prices  is partly explained  by the strategy  
of product  differentiation  developed  by manufacturers  to reposition  national  brands.  
More  precisely,  they  find  that  an  increase  in  private  label  market  share  incentives  
suppliers  to changes  the  characteristics  of their  products  and  the  increase  in national  
brand  prices  is explained  by the channges  in product  repositioning. 
Indeed,  Ward et al. (2002) point  out  that  the simplest  way to explain  price increases  in 
response  to  private- label  entry  is that  brand  manufacturers  may  raise  the  quality  of 
their  goods  when  faced  with  private- label entry.  But this  means  that  it is possible  to 
read  their  empirical  findings  as  supporting  an  aspect  of  the  ‘conventional  wisdom’ 
which is also one of the key predictions  of our  framework.
5. Summary  and Concluding  Remarks
Retailing concentration  and  the  development  of store  brands  are profoundly  changing  
vertical relationships  between  food  manufacturers  and  retailers. We have examined  the 
consequences  of  vertical  competition  between  manufacturers’  brands  and  retailers’ 
23store  brands  by incorporating  the  notion  of delisting  as a distinct  and  further  source  
of increasing  returns  to non- price strategies  of product  differentiation  and  innovation.  
In  our  conceptual  framework,  a  retailer’s  private  label  competes  with  asymmetric  
national  manufacturers  brands.  The strength  of a manufacturer  brand  plays  a key role 
in affecting  the retailer’s margin  and  its delisting  decisions.  
We  started   from   the   Steiner’s   hypothesis   of   a   negative   relationship   between   the  
strength  of national  brands  and  the  retailer’s  margin.  However,  while Steiner  focused  
only on the  margin  depressing  effect, the  key intuition  provided  by our  framework  is 
that  the  effectiveness  of advertising  and  R&D is even higher  in a two- stage  framework  
with  delisting  since  non- price  strategies  of  innovation  and  differentiation  not  only 
allow  the  manufacturer  the  benefit  of  a  lower  retailer’s  margin  but  also  a  greater  
probability  of avoiding  delinsting.  Thus,  vertical  competitition  and  retailers’ delisting  
decisions  create  a further  mechanism,  in addition  to the  margin  depressing  effect  (the 
‘Steiner  effect’), leading  to even  greater  incentives  to adopt  non- price  strategies.  This 
‘delisting  effect’ increases  the effectiveness  of advertising  and  R&D expenditure.  
The intuition  is that  it is vital for  manufacturers  willing to remain  sellers  of branded  
products  to  keep  brand  loyalty  of  their  brands  at  a level higher  than  retailer’ store  
loyalty. And the  only way to pursue  this  goal and  avoid  to be involved  into  the  risk of 
being delisted  is to boost  brands.
We also show  that  the risk of being delisted  is higher  for second- tier brands.  Retailers  
have  strong  incentives  to  replace  secondary  brands  with  private  labels  so  that  these  
brands  face intense  vertical competitive pressures.
The  framework  developed  is useful  to  organizing  and  interpreting  several  empirical 
patterns.  The  evidence  provided  by  recent  empirical  works  is  consistent  with  the  
framework’s predictions.
The mechanisms  examined  are still waiting  for  more  formal  theoretical  and  empirical 
analyses.   More  systematic   efforts   in   this   direction  is  needed.   But   there   are   good  
theoretical   and   empirical   reasons   for   concluding   that   vertical   competition   affects  
positively  food  product  innovation  and  differentiation  contributing   to  explain  the  
increasing  relevance  of non- price strategies  in the food  industry.
But  our  framework  highlights  several  areas  which  deserve  more  exploration.  Both 
theoretical   and   empirical.research   is   needed   to   examine   formally   the   issues   here  
provided  at  an  intermediate  formal  level.  One  area  that  might  benefit  from  more  
exploration,  for  instance,  regards  the  trends  towards  high  quality  store  brands.  A 
further  important  topic  is  the  impact  of  retailers’  private  label  programs  on  store  
loyalty.  The  empirical  research  about  the  the  role  of  store  brands  in building  store  
loyalty  is clearly  a topic  issue.  An important  step  for  further  research  would  be  to 
extend  the  analysis  of  welfare  implications.  Our  framework  does  not  support  the 
hypothesis  that  large- scale  retailing,  buyer  power  and  store  brands  lead  to  negative 
impacts  on  upstream  incentives.  This  does  not  imply  that  retail  concentration  might  
not  lead  to negative  implications  for  social welfare.  But the  channel  leading  to social 
loss  might  have more  to do with static  efficiency loss  due  to retail prices  and  retailers  
market  power  in local  markets  rather  than  with  negative  consequences  of the  retail 
industry’s  concentration  on  upstream  dynamic  efficiency.  In   any  case,   the  overall 
impact  of vertical competition  on social welfare  still needs  to be analysed  and  should  
represent  a crucial area of research  in the next years.
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